Rent seeking and the economics of corruption

Toke Aidt

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

Abstract: The paper studies the influence of Gordon Tullock (1967) and the rent-seeking literature more generally on the study of corruption. The theoretical corruption literature with its emphasis on principal-agent relationships within government and rent creation by corruption politicians has largely, but not entirely, overlooked that contestable rents encourage unproductive use of real resources in seeking these rents. As a consequence, the literature underestimates the value of corruption control and the cost of corruption itself.

Keywords: Rent seeking; Corruption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-03-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe and nep-pol
Note: tsa23
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (56)

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Journal Article: Rent seeking and the economics of corruption (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:1621

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