Contracting in a market with differential information

Marta Rocha and Thomas Greve ()

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

Abstract: This Consider an oligopolistic industry where two firms have access to the same technology and compete in prices, but one firm has access to better information about the customers in the market. We assume that better information allows the better informed firm to attract specific customers. The better informed firm obtains a first customer contact advantage, whereas the uninformed firm can only offer a menu of prices without being able to pre-identify the types of customers. We show that better information does not lead to higher profit.

JEL-codes: D43 D82 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-12-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com and nep-cta
Note: tg336
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https://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/sites/default/files/pub ... pe-pdfs/cwpe1657.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Contracting in a Market with Differential Information (2021)
Working Paper: Contracting in a market with differential information (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:1657

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