EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Contacts, Altruism and Competing Externalities

Flavio Toxvaerd

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

Abstract: This paper considers voluntary transmissive contacts between partially altruistic individuals in the presence of asymptomatic infection. Two different types of externalities from contacts are considered, infection externalities and socioeconomic externalities. When contacts are incidental, then externalities work through disease propagation. When contacts are essential, both infection and socioeconomic externalities are present. It is shown that for incidental contacts, equilibrium involves suboptimally high exposure whereas for essential contacts, equilibrium exposure is suboptimally low. An increase in altruism may thus increase or decrease disease transmission, depending on the type of contact under consideration. The analysis implies that policy to manage the epidemic should differentiate between different types of tranmissive activities.

Keywords: Epidemics; altruism; infection externalities; socioeconomic externalities; disease control (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 I12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-02-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea and nep-hpe
Note: fmot2
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/sites/default/files/pub ... pe-pdfs/cwpe2135.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: Contacts, Altruism and Competing Externalities (2021) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:2135

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jake Dyer ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-22
Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:2135