I know best: Scepticism about the Knowledge of Experts and Peers on Economics Predictions

Marina Agranov, Matt Elliott and Pietro Ortoleva

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

Abstract: Are individuals willing to change their minds when experts or their peers disagree with them? In an incentivized experiment on a representative sample, we collect binary predictions on unemployment and inflation. Then, we ask whether participants would like to change their predictions if the (vast) majority of experts (or peers) made the other choice. Very few participants are willing to change their predictions indicating a profound lack of trust in experts and the collective wisdom of peers. Nevertheless, there is variation by demographics. Further, scepticism in experts in this domain helps explain participants intention to vaccinate, providing some external validity.

Keywords: Trust; Experts; Social learning; Information policies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 D80 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-05-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-soc
Note: mle30
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:2423

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