What Happens When Voting Rules Change? The Case of New Zealand

J. Stephen Ferris

No 19-03, Carleton Economic Papers from Carleton University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper examines the impact of New Zealand’s 1996 adoption of a mixed member proportional (MMP) voting scheme on representation in the legislature, voter turnout, vote volatility and the likelihood of an incumbent party winning re-election. I then consider whether MMP has had any negative consequences for the effectiveness of government policy in relation to fiscal accountability and countercyclical intervention. The data used in the analysis begins from the formation of the party system in New Zealand (in 1890) and extends through the adoption of MMP to the present (2017). The data set covers 42 elections: 34 before 1996 and 8 after.

Keywords: Institutional change; Mixed Member Proportional Voting; Vote turnout; Vote volatilities; Winning margins; New Zealand (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 H62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2019-06-05, Revised 2020-03-29
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Published: Carleton Economic Papers

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Journal Article: What happens when voting rules change? the case of New Zealand (2020)
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