Effects of Medicare Advantage Enrollment on Beneficiary Risk Scores: Working Paper 2017-08

Alice Burns and Tamara Hayford

No 53270, Working Papers from Congressional Budget Office

Abstract: Medicare beneficiaries may receive services through a traditional fee-for-service (FFS) program or they may enroll in Medicare Advantage (MA), under which they select a private health insurance plan. Medicare pays the MA plan to provide beneficiaries’ health care services. Medicare adjusts payments to MA plans based on beneficiaries’ demographic characteristics and documented health conditions: those traits are summarized in a risk score that estimates the relationship between beneficiary characteristics and FFS Medicare spending. Recent literature finds that health

JEL-codes: H53 I13 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-11-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ias
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