In the mirror of the market: the disciplinary effects of company/fund manager meetings

John Roberts, Paul Sanderson, John Hendry and Richard Barker

Working Papers from Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge

Abstract: We consider the consequences of the regular private meetings between directors of FTSE 100 companies and their major institutional shareholders. Whilst the economic incentives for both the flow of information and the formation of 'strategic informational relationships' between the two have been described elsewhere, little attention has been paid to date to the effects that increased levels of monitoring and surveillance have on the conduct and performance of company directors. We present findings from a qualitative study in which we interviewed finance directors and fund managers, and observed a series of meetings between them. We draw on Foucault's analysis of the operation of disciplinary power to suggest that the meetings serve as ritual reminders to directors that their primary objective must be the pursuit of shareholder value, a task that whilst empowering, may also have unintended consequences.

JEL-codes: D83 D84 G23 G34 O16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-fin
Note: PRO-2
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