How do family ties, boards and regulation affect pay at the top? Evidence for Indian CEOs

Sonja Fagernäs ()

Working Papers from Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge

Abstract: This paper investigates the effects of corporate governance factors and family ties on the pay of managing directors in a sample of Indian stock listed companies. It uses a unique seven-year firm level panel dataset and controls for firm performance and both CEO and firm specific fixed effects. The hypothesis is that corporate governance, ownership structures and market pressure shape the power relations between the board and managers, and affect the level and structure of CEO pay. The evidence for India supports these hypotheses. Managing directors, who are related to the founding family, or controlling group, or any of the members on the board of directors, are paid more. This holds for total pay and both for the less variable component and the performance-related component of pay. In contrast, the presence of outside representatives on the board - non-executive directors or nominees of creditors or institutional investors - is found to have a disciplinary effect. The presence of nominees lowers the level of pay and that of non-executives ties pay more to firm performance. A further timely finding is that the staged introduction of a recent mandatory corporate governance code, aiming to improve governance and pay disclosure in listed companies, has raised the tendency of firms to tie pay explicitly to firm performance. Overall, the practice of tying pay explicitly to performance has become more common over time.

Keywords: Executive pay; Corporate Governance; Family firms; Corporate Law; India (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 J33 K22 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cwa, nep-lab and nep-law
Note: PRO-2
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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