Reliability and Responsibility: A Theory of Endogenous Commitment

Matteo Triossi

No 21, Carlo Alberto Notebooks from Collegio Carlo Alberto

Abstract: A common assumption in Political Science literature is policy commitment: candidates maintain their electoral promises. We drop such assumption and we show that costless electoral campaign can be an effective way of transmitting information to voters. The result is robust to relevant equilibrium refinements. An unavoidable proportion of ambiguous politicians emerges.

Keywords: Information Transmission; Electoral Campaign; Endogenous Commitment. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D72 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2006
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-knm and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cca:wpaper:21

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