Competition and Post-Transplant Outcomes in Cadaveric Liver Transplantation under the MELD Scoring System

Harry Paarsch, Alberto M. Segre, John P. Roberts and Jeffrey B. Halldorson

No 213, Carlo Alberto Notebooks from Collegio Carlo Alberto

Abstract: Previous researchers have modelled the decision to accept a donor organ for transplantation as a Markov decision problem, the solution to which is often a control-limit optimal policy: accept any organ whose match quality exceeds some health-dependent threshold; otherwise, wait for another. When competing transplant centers vie for the same organs, the decision rule changes relative to no competition; the relative size of competing centers affects the decision rules as well. Using center-specific graft and patient survival-rate data for cadaveric adult livers in the United States, we have found empirical evidence supporting these predictions.

Keywords: liver transplantation; competition; optimal stopping (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C14 I12 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 51 pages
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea
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Working Paper: Competition and Post-Transplant Outcomes in Cadaveric Liver Transplantation under the MELD Scoring System (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cca:wpaper:213

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