Preempting versus Postponing: the Stealing Game

Andrea Gallice

No 281, Carlo Alberto Notebooks from Collegio Carlo Alberto

Abstract: We present an endogenous timing game of action commitment in which play- ers can steal from each other parts of a homogeneous and perfectly divisible pie and the expected effectiveness of a player?s theft is proportional to the amount he currently owns. We show how the incentives to preempt or to follow the rivals change with the number of players involved in the game and we inves- tigate the conditions that lead to the occurrence of symmetric or asymmetric equilibria.

Keywords: stealing; endogenous timing games. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe
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Related works:
Working Paper: Preempting versus Postponing: the Stealing Game (2008)
Working Paper: Preempting versus Postponing: the Stealing Game (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cca:wpaper:281

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