UK Merger Remedies under Scrutiny

Michael Harker (m.harker@uea.ac.uk)
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Michael Harker: Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia

No 06-16, Working Papers from Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia

Abstract: This paper focuses on the Somerfield decision of the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT). In that decision, the CAT demonstrated a high degree of deference to the Competition Commission where the latter was scoping divestiture remedies in a merger case. This approach is consistent with the case law of the US and the EC and, it is argued, is appropriate given the need for procedural expediency. The decision is placed in the wider context of the debates over the efficacy of merger remedies and the appropriate limits of judicial supervision of agency discretion in this area.

Keywords: Merger remedies; divestiture; merger appraisal (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2006-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-law and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ccp:wpaper:wp06-16

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