Bargaining over Remedies in Merger Regulation

Bruce Lyons () and Andrei Medvedev
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Bruce Lyons: Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia

No 07-3, Working Papers from Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia

Abstract: This paper provides a first attempt to understand how outcomes are determined by the standard institutions of merger control. In particular, we focus on the internationally standard 2-phase investigation structure and remedy negotiations of the form practiced by the EC. We find that there are inherent biases in remedy outcomes, and identifiable circumstances where offers will be excessive and where they will be deficient. In particular, we find clear circumstances in which firms offer excessive remedies, which goes against a possible intuition that firms should expect to extract an information rent for possessing superior information about competition in the market.

Keywords: Merger regulation; merger remedies; competition policy; bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L41 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2007-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-law, nep-mic and nep-reg
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Bargaining over Remedies in Merger Regulation (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ccp:wpaper:wp07-03

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