An Economic Assessment of EC Merger Control: 1957–2007

Bruce Lyons ()
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Bruce Lyons: School of Economics and Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia

No 08-17, Working Papers from Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia

Abstract: This paper provides an assessment of EC merger policy from three perspectives. First, it places the evolution of merger policy alongside the evolution of economic ideas in relation to competition and industrial organisation. Second, it highlights recent developments in the practical economic appraisal of competition in four areas: unilateral (non-coordinated) effects, particularly the appropriate use of simulation techniques and the efficiency defence; coordinated effects (collective dominance), particularly the role of the Community Courts; non-horizontal effects, particularly the need for the new guidelines; and remedies, particularly weaknesses in current practice. Third, it develops a simple bargaining approach to merger policy evaluation to draw conclusions about the trend in overall effectiveness of EC merger policy since 1989.

Keywords: merger control; unilateral effects; collective dominance; remedies; merger policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 K21 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 58 pages
Date: 2008-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-eec, nep-his, nep-ind and nep-law
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ccp:wpaper:wp08-17

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