Collusion and Strategic Favoritism in Organizations

Zhijun Chen

No 08-27, Working Papers from Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia

Abstract: Fighting collusion has long been a challenge in organizations, whilst favoritism in organizations has long been attacked as one of the most important sources of workplace conflicts. This paper links the phenomena of collusion and favoritism together which seem to be irrelevant. We show that favoritism cannot benefit organizations where collusion is not a serious concern; meanwhile favoritism is not effective in dealing with well-organized collusion; however, strategic use of favoritism can bring conflicts among collusive subordinates and undermine the efficiency of collusion, therefore it is effective in fighting collusion.

Keywords: collusion; favoritism; tournaments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2008-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cse and nep-gth
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Working Paper: Collusion and Strategic Favoritism in Organizations (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ccp:wpaper:wp08-27

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