Beyond the Cartel Law Handbook: How Corruption, Social Norms and Collectivist Business Cultures can Undermine Conventional Enforcement Tools

Andreas Stephan ()
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Andreas Stephan: Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia

No 08-29, Working Papers from Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia

Abstract: The combination of leniency programmes, high sanctions, complaints from customers and private actions for damages, has proven very successful at uncovering and punishing cartel agreements in the US. Countless jurisdictions are being encouraged to adopt these ‘conventional’ enforcement tools, in the absence of an international competition authority. The purpose of this paper is to widen the debate on cartel enforcement by identifying three issues which can undermine their effectiveness in some jurisdictions: (1) Corruption and organised crime; (2) Social norms that are sympathetic to collusive practices; (3) Collectivist business cultures built on personal relationships.

Keywords: cartels; leniency programmes; enforcement; corruption; organised crime; social norms; collectivism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 K21 K42 L40 Z1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2008-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-law and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ccp:wpaper:wp08-29

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