Econometric Evidence on the Impacts of Privatization, New Entry, and Independent Industry Regulator on Mobile Network Penetration and Expansion

Yan Li ()
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Yan Li: Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia

No 08-35, Working Papers from Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia

Abstract: This study examines the impacts of reforms – privatization, new entry and independent regulatory authority – on mobile network penetration and expansion using a new and hitherto unused panel dataset for 30 national mobile markets (i.e. 29 OECD countries and China) over the time period 1991-2006 under a 3-equation econometric framework. The estimation results confirm that introducing new entry is, in general, positively correlated with mobile network penetration and expansion; and in particular, the third entry brings many more benefits than the second one. The results also highlight the crucial role of an independent regulator in privatized mobile markets. Especially, the dynamic estimation results suggest that without an independent regulator, privatization is, on average, negatively correlated with mobile network expansion, even in certain competitive market environments.

Keywords: New entry; privatization; independent regulator; mobile network; econometric analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K23 L10 L51 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2008-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ent, nep-law, nep-mic, nep-net, nep-reg and nep-tra
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