Qualitative analysis of common belief of rationality in strategic-form games

Giacomo Bonanno () and Elias Tsakas
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Elias Tsakas: Department of Economics, University of California Davis

No 181, Working Papers from University of California, Davis, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study common belief of rationality in strategic-form games with ordinal utilities, employing a model of qualitative beliefs. We characterize the three main solution concepts for such games, viz., Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies (IDSDS), Iterated Deletion of Boergers-dominated Strategies (IDBS) and Iterated Deletion of Inferior Strategy Profiles (IDIP), by means of gradually restrictive properties imposed on the models of qualitative beliefs. As a corollary, we prove that IDIP refines IDBS, which refines IDSDS.

Keywords: Qualitative likelihood relation; ordinal payoffs; common belief of rationality; iterative deletion procedures (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16
Date: 2017-05-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic, nep-ore and nep-upt
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