Kuhn's Theorem for Extensive Games with Unawareness

Burkhard Schipper
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Burkhard Schipper: Department of Economics, University of California Davis

No 204, Working Papers from University of California, Davis, Department of Economics

Abstract: We extend Kuhn's Theorem to extensive games with unawareness. This extension is not entirely obvious: First, extensive games with non-trivial unawareness involve a forest of partially ordered game trees rather than just one game tree. An information set at a history in one tree may consist of histories in a less expressive tree. Consequently, perfect recall takes a more complicated form as players may also become aware of new actions during the play. Second, strategies can only be partially an object of ex-ante choice in games with unawareness. Finally, histories that a player may expect to reach with a strategy profile may not be the histories that actually occur with this strategy profile, requiring us to define appropriate notions of equivalence of strategies.

Keywords: perfect recall; mixed strategy; behavior strategy; unawareness. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22
Date: 2017-11-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cda:wpaper:204

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