Conditional dominance in games with unawareness

Martin Meier and Burkhard Schipper

No 351, Working Papers from University of California, Davis, Department of Economics

Abstract: Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2013) introduced generalized extensive-form games that allow for asymmetric unawareness. Here, we study the normal form of a generalized extensive-form game. The generalized normal-form game associated to a generalized extensive-form game with unawareness may consist of a collection of normal-form games. We use it to characterize extensive-form rationalizability (resp. prudent rationalizability) in generalized extensive-form games by iterative conditional strict (resp. weak) dominance in the associated generalized normal-form. We also show that the analogue to iterated admissibility for generalized normal-form games is not independent of the extensive-form structure. This is because under unawareness, a player's information set not only determines which nodes he considers possible but also of which game tree(s) he is aware of.

Keywords: Awareness; unknown unknowns; extensive-form rationalizability; prudent rationalizability; iterated admissibility; iterated conditional dominance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30
Date: 2022-08-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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