Level-k Thinking in the Extensive Form

Burkhard Schipper and Hang Zhou
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Hang Zhou: Department of Economics, University of California Davis

No 352, Working Papers from University of California, Davis, Department of Economics

Abstract: Level-k thinking has been widely applied as a solution concept for games in normal form in behavioral and experimental game theory. We consider level-k thinking in games in extensive form. Player's may learn about levels of opponents' thinking during the play of the game because some information sets may be inconsistent with certain levels. In particular, for any information set reached, a level-k player attaches the maximum level-l thinking for l

Keywords: Level-k thinking; Cognitive hierarchy; Theory-of-Mind; Rationalizability; Iterated admissibility; Strong rationalizability; Extensive-form rationalizability; ∆-rationalizability; Backward rationalizability; Mutual belief in rationality; Experimental game theory. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 51
Date: 2022-09-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cda:wpaper:352

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