Motives Behind Cooperation in Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

Anujit Chakraborty
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Anujit Chakraborty: Department of Economics, University of California Davis

No 353, Working Papers from University of California, Davis, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper deploys a novel experiment to compare four theories that explain both selfish and non-selfish cooperation. The four theories capture incomplete information (à la Kreps et al. (1982)) alongside the following four non-selfish motives: caring about others (Altruism), being conscientious about cooperation (Duty), enjoying social-efficiency (Efficiency-Seeking), and reciprocity (Sequential Reciprocity). Our experimental design varies the decline-rate of future rewards, under which these theories make contrasting predictions. We find that Efficiency-Seeking is the other-regarding behavior that fits the experimental data best. A Finite Mixture Model analysis finds that 40-49% of our subjects are selfish, 36-45% are Efficiency-seeking, 1-4% are Duty players, and 6-20% are Altruistic.

JEL-codes: C72 C73 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 76
Date: 2022-09-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cda:wpaper:353

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