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Strength of Partisan and Candidate Ties in India

Aditi Singhal
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Aditi Singhal: Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics

No 266, Working papers from Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics

Abstract: This study estimates the impact of incumbency on re-election prospects of parties and candidates in India, between 1977 and 2014, for Lok Sabha elections. We make use of regression discontinuity design to estimate the causal effect of incumbency by comparing outcomes in closely fought elections. Results indicate that on an average, incumbent parties are significantly disadvantaged in comparison to non-incumbent parties. Similarly, the causal impact of incumbency on candidates highlights significant disadvantage to the incumbents. Moreover, on comparing the results, we conclude that it is a candidate who is more disadvantaged than a party. This is indicative of stronger ties amongst voters and parties rather than with candidates.

Keywords: Elections; party; candidates; regression discontinuity design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2016-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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