Public Private Partnerships Vs. Traditional Roads Project Delivery Time, Costs and Quality
Ram Singh ()
No 290, Working papers from Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics
Abstract:
The Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) have become a mainstay of plans of the Centre and the State governments towards infrastructure development. In this article, we discuss the various considerations behind the rampant use of PPPs for infrastructure services. Next, we empirically examine a widely held belief that PPPs are better than the traditional approach towards infrastructure in that they can deliver superior quality infrastructure at a faster rate and lower costs. Using a dataset of 313 national highways projects, we compare the performance of the PPP and the traditional government (non-PPP) road projects. We show that the project delays are relatively short for PPPs, but the cost overruns are significantly higher for PPP roads than for the government managed road projects. The available evidence suggests that the quality of PPP roads is superior to the government roads. However, the overall quality of road services under PPPs is deficient on several counts.
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2018-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ppm, nep-tre and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
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