Unraveling of Value-Rankings in Auctions with Resale

Sanyyam Khurana ()

No 308, Working papers from Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics

Abstract: Consider a single-unit auction with resale and two risk neutral bidders. The ranking of the valuations is known to both the bidders—that is, the bidders know the identity of the highest and lowest valuation bidders. We show that, with the revelation of value-rankings, the classic result of “bid symmetrization” does not hold. Surprisingly, the bidder with the lowest valuation produces a stronger bid distribution than the bidder with the highest valuation. We also show that the revelation of value-rankings in auctions with resale asymmetrizes the bidding strategies. Finally, under restrictive assumptions, we compare seller’s and bidders’ ranking of a first-price and second-price auction.

JEL-codes: D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2020-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://econdse.org/wp-content/uploads/work308.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Unraveling of value-rankings in auctions with resale (2024)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cde:cdewps:308

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cdedse.org/

The price is free.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working papers from Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics Delhi 110 007. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sanjeev Sharma ().