Arrow's paradox and markets for nonproprietary information

Samuli Lepp l ()
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Samuli Lepp l: Cardiff Business School, http://business.cardiff.ac.uk/people/staff/samuli-lepp-l
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Samuli Mikael Leppälä

No E2013/2, Cardiff Economics Working Papers from Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section

Abstract: Arrow's information paradox asserts that demand for undisclosed information is undefined. Reassessing the paradox, I argue that the value of information for the buyer depends on its relevance, which can be known ex ante, and the uncertainty shifts to the capability of the seller to acquire the knowledge and her reliability in disclosing it. These three together form the buyer s reservation price. Consequently, differences in capability and reliability between the sellers may revoke the appropriation problem of nonproprietary information, where the original source loses her monopoly after the first purchase.

Keywords: Arrow s information paradox; markets for information; knowledge; reliability; appropriability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 L15 O31 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2013-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-ipr, nep-pr~ and nep-mic
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