Media negativity bias and tax compliance: Experimental evidence
Miloš Fišar,
Tommaso Reggiani (),
Fabio Sabatini and
Jiří Špalek
No E2021/26, Cardiff Economics Working Papers from Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section
Abstract:
We study the impact of the media negativity bias on tax compliance. Through a framed laboratory experiment, we assess how the exposure to biased news about government action affects compliance in a repeated taxation game. Subjects treated with positive news are signicantly more compliant than the control group. Instead, the exposure to negative news does not prompt any significant reaction compared to the neutral condition, suggesting that participants may perceive the media negativity bias in the selection and tonality of news as the norm rather than the exception. Overall, our results suggest that biased news provision is a constant source of psychological priming and plays a vital role in taxpayers' compliance decisions.
Keywords: tax compliance; media bias; taxation game; laboratory experiment. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D70 H26 H31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 69 pages
Date: 2021-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-iue, nep-pbe, nep-pub and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
Downloads: (external link)
http://carbsecon.com/wp/E2021_26.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Media negativity bias and tax compliance: experimental evidence (2022) 
Working Paper: Media negativity bias and tax compliance: Experimental evidence (2021) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2021/26
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Cardiff Economics Working Papers from Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Yongdeng Xu ().