Competition for Budget-Constrained Buyers: Exploring All-Pay Auctions

Cemil Selcuk

No E2024/26, Cardiff Economics Working Papers from Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section

Abstract: When faced with budget-constrained bidders, all-pay auctions revenue-dominate standard auctions (first and second-price), which, in a competitive market, gives an edge to the all-pay format. An equilibrium in which sellers compete with standard auctions fails to exist if the all-pay format is available. Assuming the budget is not severely limited, in the unique symmetric equilibrium sellers compete with all-pay auctions.

Keywords: All-pay Auctions; Budget Constraints; Directed Search; Competing Auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 D81 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2024-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://carbsecon.com/wp/E2024_26.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Competition for Budget-Constrained Buyers: Exploring All-Pay Auctions (2024)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2024/26

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cardiff Economics Working Papers from Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Yongdeng Xu ().