Endogenous Timing in General Rent?Seeking and Conflict Models

Grégoire Rota-Graziosi () and Magnus Hoffmann
Additional contact information
Grégoire Rota-Graziosi: Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches sur le Développement International(CERDI)
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Grégoire ROTA GRAZIOSI

No 201024, Working Papers from CERDI

Abstract: This paper examines simultaneous versus sequential choice of effort in a twoplayer contest with a general contest success function. The timing of moves, determined in a pre?play stage prior to the contest?subgame, as well as the value of the prize is allowed to be endogenous. Contrary to endogenous timing models with an exogenously fixed prize the present paper finds the following. (1) Players may decide to choose their effort simultaneously in the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the extended game, (2) the SPE does not need to be unique, (3) in particular, there is no unique SPE with sequential moves if costs of effort are exclusively endogenously determined, (4) if the unique SPE is sequential play, the win probability in the NE is in no way crucial for the determination of an endogenous leadership, (5) and symmetry among players does not rule out incentives for precommitment to effort locally away from the Nash?Cournot level

Keywords: Contests; Endogenous timing; Endogenous prize (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D23 D30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://publi.cerdi.org/ed/2010/2010.24.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://publi.cerdi.org/ed/2010/2010.24.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://publi.cerdi.org/ed/2010/2010.24.pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models (2012)
Working Paper: Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models (2012)
Working Paper: Endogenous Timing in General Rent‐Seeking and Conflict Models (2011)
Working Paper: Endogenous Timing in General Rent-Seeking and Conflict Models (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdi:wpaper:1193

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from CERDI Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Vincent Mazenod ().