Use of Internal Information, External Information Acquisition and Customs Underreporting

Cyril Chalendard

No 201522, Working Papers from CERDI

Abstract: This paper identifies opportunities for improving the performance of revenue-collection authorities. To detect and combat fraud, we argue that revenue-collection authorities should, notably in the absence of reliable third-party information, exploit non-usual sources of information. Specifically, our micro-level study of customs evasion provides evidence that using internal or external available sources of information facilitates customs-enforcement. Estimates highlight that exploiting historical data and/or relying on an information provider — a pre-shipment inspection company —significantly reduces observed trade statistics discrepancies. The potential endogeneity of pre-shipment inspections is addressed by using instrumental variables. Robust to a variety of additional checks, findings notably suggest that governments should work on the introduction of an automatic exchange of information system across customs authorities to substantially offset the informational advantage of the importer.

Keywords: Use of internal information; External Information acquisition; Customs enforcement; Tax evasion; Pre-shipment inspections. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 H26 H83 K42 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35
Date: 2015-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ict, nep-iue and nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Working Paper: Use of internal information, external information acquisition and customs underreporting (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdi:wpaper:1722

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