Political Budget Cycles: Manipulation of Leaders or Bias from Research? A Meta-Regression Analysis

Antoine Cazals () and Pierre Mandon ()

No 201533, Working Papers from CERDI

Abstract: Despite a long history of research on political budget cycles, their existence and magnitude are still in question. By conducting a systematic analysis of the existing literature we intend to clarify the debate. Based on data collected from over 1,700 regressions and 58 studies, our meta-analysis suggests that leaders do manipulate fiscal tools in order to be re-elected but to an extent that is significantly exaggerated by scholars. However, we show the incumbents' strategy differ depending on which tools they leverage. Finally, we discuss in further details how authors' methodological choices and country institutions affect political budget cycles.

Keywords: Political cycles; Budget manipulation; Meta-analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C82 D72 D78 E62 H0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 54
Date: 2015-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac and nep-pol
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in , 5 2016, pages

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdi:wpaper:1766

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from CERDI Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Vincent Mazenod ().