Prospects for Improving U.S. Patent Quality via Post-grant Opposition

Bronwyn Hall, Stuart Graham, Dietmar Harhoff () and David C. Mowery

Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series from Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley

Abstract: The recent surge in U.S. patenting and expansion of patentable subject matter has increased patent office backlogs and raised concerns that in some cases patents of insufficient quality or with inadequate search of prior art are being issued. At the same time patent litigation and its costs are rising. This paper explores the potential of a post-grant review process modeled on the European opposition system to improve patent quality, reveal overlooked prior art, and reduce subsequent litigation. We argue that the welfare gains to such a system may be substantial.

Keywords: patent system; litigation; intellectual property; opposition; reexamination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-05-02
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/4wq4g70r.pdf;origin=repeccitec (application/pdf)

Related works:
Chapter: Prospects for Improving US Patent Quality via Postgrant Opposition (2004)
Working Paper: Prospects for Improving U.S. Patent Quality via Post-grant Opposition (2004)
Working Paper: Prospects for Improving U.S. Patent Quality via Post-grant Opposition (2003)
Working Paper: Prospects for Improving U.S. Patent Quality via Post-grant Opposition (2003)
Working Paper: Prospects for Improving U.S. Patent Quality via Post-grant Opposition (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdl:compol:qt4wq4g70r

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series from Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lisa Schiff ().