Why Weak Ties' Help and Strong Ties' Don't: Reconsidering Why Tie Strength Matters

Sandra Susan Smith

Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper Series from Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley

Abstract: If jobholders are more motivated to help jobseekers to whom they are strongly tied rather than those to whom they are weakly tied, why do jobholders so often help acquaintances and strangers instead of kin and friends? The strength-of-weak-ties theory holds that weak ties are more likely to be conduits for information and influence that best leads to jobs. Recent research, however, calls into question the theory’s key assumption that this is because strongties cannot act as bridges (they can). Drawing from in-depth interviews with 146 blue- and white-collar workers at a large public sector employer, in this paper I offer an alternative explanation for why weak ties matter, one rooted in cognitive and affective processes: Jobholders often know too much about their close associates’ flaws and so assess the risks of making a bad match as high. They also worry more about the implications of close associates’ failures for their own reputations.

Keywords: Social and Behavioral Sciences; Job Seekers; Strength of Weak Ties (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-07-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hme and nep-soc
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