Three Essays On Tax Salience: Market Salience and Political Salience

David Gamage and Darien Shanske

Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series from Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics

Abstract: This Article analyzes the behavioral economics literatures on how individuals understand taxation (i.e., tax salience). We evaluate how taxpayers respond to different presentations of tax prices both in their roles as market participants and as voters. We aim to combat several naïve notions about tax salience that currently exert a pernicious influence on tax lawmaking. In particular, we argue that it is normatively desirable for governments to reduce tax salience with respect to market decision making, and that there is nothing normatively objectionable about governments also reducing tax salience with respect to political decision making.

Keywords: Economics; Law and Economics; Politics; Taxation; Taxation-Federal Income; Law (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-02-15
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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