Hard Evidence and Mechanism Design
Jesse Bull (bullj@fiu.edu) and
Joel Watson
University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, UC San Diego
Abstract:
In this short paper, we show how hard evidence can be incorporated into the mechanism-design framework. We model the parties' inalienable decisions (evidence production) as distinct from an arbitrarily-designed message form. A mechanism specifies the message form and how the public decision is a function of messages and evidence. Our work is thus along the lines of Myerson (1982, 1991), whose mechanism-design analysis nicely distinguishes between inalienable private and public decisions.
Keywords: mechanism-design model; evidence production (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-09-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (30)
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Related works:
Journal Article: Hard evidence and mechanism design (2007)
Working Paper: Hard Evidence and Mechanism Design (2006)
Working Paper: Hard Evidence and Mechanism Design (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdl:ucsdec:qt7715f08f
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