“Fatal Attraction” and Level-k thinking in games with Non-neutral frames

Vincent Crawford

University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, UC San Diego

Abstract: Traditional game theory assumes that if framing does not affect a game's payoffs, it will not influence behavior. However, Rubinstein and Tversky (1993), Rubinstein, Tversky, and Heller (1996), and Rubinstein (1999) reported experiments eliciting initial responses to hide-and-seek and other types of game, in which subjects’ behavior responded systematically to non-neutral framing via decision labelings. Crawford and Iriberri (2007ab) proposed a level-k explanation of Rubinstein et al.'s results for hide-and-seek games. Heap, Rojo-Arjona, and Sugden's (2014) criticized Crawford and Iriberri's model on grounds of portability. This paper clarifies Heap et al.'s interpretation of their results and responds to their criticisms, suggesting a way forward.

Keywords: Behavioral game theory; Experimental game theory; Strategic thinking; Level-k models; Coordination; Salience; Economic Theory; Applied Economics; Econometrics; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-12-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: “Fatal Attraction” and Level-k thinking in games with Non-neutral frames (2018)
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