The Politics and Economics of Parking on Campus

Donald Shoup

University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers from University of California Transportation Center

Abstract: Universities have tried almost every possible way to deal with the shortage of campus parking: lotteries, hunting licenses, first-come-first-served, waiting lists, seniority, and need-based systems. As another way to eliminate parking shortages, this paper proposes using the Goldilocks Principle of parking prices to balance supply and demand: the price at any location is too high if many spaces are vacant, and too low if no spaces are vacant. When a few vacant spaces are available everywhere, the prices are just right and drivers can always find a place to park. The chapter concludes by proposing a pilot program to test drivers’ responses to performance prices for campus parking.

Keywords: Social; and; Behavioral; Sciences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-09-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-tre and nep-ure
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdl:uctcwp:qt2zk4v5k3

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