The Paradox of New Members: Strategic Foundations and Experimental Evidence

Michalis Drouvelis, Maria Montero and Martin Sefton

No 2007-13, Discussion Papers from The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham

Abstract: Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may affect the balance of power between the original members even if their number of votes and the decision rule remain constant. Some of the original members may actually gain, a phenomenon known as the paradox of new members. We show that the paradox can occur as an equilibrium of a noncooperative bargaining game based on the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model of legislative bargaining. We implement this game in the laboratory and find empirical support for the paradox.

Keywords: voting; non-cooperative bargaining; power indices; experiments; paradox of new members (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-12
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Working Paper: The Paradox of New Members: Strategic Foundations and Experimental Evidence (2007)
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