Screening vs. signaling in technology licensing

Manel Antelo

No E2010/05, Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces from Centro de Estudios Andaluces

Abstract: A patent holder owning a two-period lasting innovation is unable to push it into the market, so it is licensed to a downstream user with production capabilities to market it. The production cost of this firm can be low or high, but the patent holder has only a prior on this fact

Keywords: Licensing; asymmetric information; screening; signaling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 L12 L13 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-ind, nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-pr~ and nep-tid
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cea:doctra:e2010_05

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