Regulatory reform in Greece: the benefits of removing maximum mark-ups

Christos Genakos, Pantelis Koutroumpis and Mario Pagliero

CentrePiece - The magazine for economic performance from Centre for Economic Performance, LSE

Abstract: Regulations that impose maximum mark-ups are intended to protect consumers from firms exercising market power. But a study by Christos Genakos and colleagues suggests that they can have the opposite effect: when Greece lifted controls on the market for fresh fruit and vegetables in June 2011, consumers enjoyed lower prices.

Keywords: markup regulation; focal point; collusion; ex-post policy evaluation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-11
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