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Tax Compliance and Firms’ StrategicInterdependence

Ralph-C Bayer () and Frank Cowell ()

STICERD - Distributional Analysis Research Programme Papers from Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE

Abstract: We focus on a relatively neglected area of the tax-compliance literature ineconomics, the behaviour of firms. We examine the impact of alternativeaudit rules on receipts from a tax on profits in the context of strategicinter-dependence of firms. In the market firms may compete in terms ofeither output or price. The enforcement policy can have an effect onfirms' behaviour in two dimensions - their market decisions as well astheir compliance behaviour. An appropriate design of the enforcementpolicy can thus have a "double dividend" by manipulating firms in bothdimensions.

Keywords: Tax compliance; evasion; oligopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H20 H21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-02
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Tax compliance and firms' strategic interdependence (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: Tax Compliance and Firms' Strategic Interdependence (2006) Downloads
Working Paper: Tax compliance and firms' strategic interdependence (2006) Downloads
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