Just Rewards?Local Politics and Public ResourceAllocation in South India

Timothy Besley, Rohini Pande and Vijayendra Rao

STICERD - Development Economics Papers - From 2008 this series has been superseded by Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers from Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE

Abstract: This paper uses data on elected village councils in South India to examine thepolitical economy of public resource allocation. We find that the pattern ofpolicy-making reflects politicians' self-interest. Elected councillors benefit fromimproved personal access to public resources. In addition, the headcouncillor's group identity and residence influences public resource allocation.While electoral incentives do not eliminate politician opportunism, votersappear able to use their electoral clout to gain greater access to publicresources.

Keywords: decentralization; India; Panchayat. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 H76 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cwa, nep-dev, nep-pbe and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Just Rewards? Local Politics and Public Resource Allocation in South India (2012)
Working Paper: Just rewards? Local politics and public resource allocation in South India (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cep:stidep:49

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