Manager Assignment and Project Returns: Evidence from the World Bank

Nicola Limodio

STICERD - Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers Series from Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE

Abstract: I study the impact of World Bank managers on project success through the value-added method. Manager effects are interpretable as performance indices and are more volatile than country effects. Both correlate positively with determinants of productivity (i.e., schooling and institutions respectively) and provide evidence of a negative assortative matching, with high-performing managers assigned to low-performing countries. Exploiting a novel variation for World Bank board access, I find a significant manager premium for countries in the board. All of these results are consistent with the World Bank behaving as a planner which assigns its managers as project inputs to client countries.

Keywords: Development Lending; Personnel Economics; International Organizations; Cost-Benefit Analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 M50 O19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ppm
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cep:stieop:61

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