Implementation of Anti-Discrimination Policy:Does Judicial Selection Matter?

Timothy Besley and A. Payne

STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series from Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE

Abstract: One of the most striking changes in labor market policy of the past fifty years has comein the form of legislation to limit discrimination in the workplace based on race, gender,disability and age. If such measures are to be effective in ending discrimination, theyneed to be enforced. The latter is dependent on state and federal agencies such as theEqual Employment Opportunities Commission and ultimately the willingness of courts tofind in favor of plaintiffs. Courts also play an important role in the evolution of antidiscriminationpolicy since past decisions create future precedent. This paper askswhether the number of charges filed with government agencies depends on the method bywhich judges are selected. Popularly elected judges should be expected to have more proemployeepreferences (selection) and should move closer to employee preferences(incentives). This should result in fewer anti-discrimination charges being filed in statesthat appoint their judges. In line with this prediction, this paper uses data on the numberof employment discrimination charges filed for the period 1973-2000 and finds that statesthat appoint their judges have fewer anti-discrimination charges being filed.

Date: 2005-08
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Related works:
Journal Article: Implementation of Anti-Discrimination Policy: Does Judicial Selection Matter? (2013)
Working Paper: Implementation of Anti-Discrimination Policy: Does Judicial Selection Matter? (2005)
Working Paper: Implementation of anti-discrimination policy: does judicial selection matter? (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cep:stipep:04

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