The Tyranny Puzzle in Welfare Economics: An empirical investigation

Marc Fleurbaey, Frank Cowell () and Bertil Tungodden

STICERD - Public Economics Programme Discussion Papers from Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE

Abstract: We address a puzzle in welfare economics - the possibility that rational people may be simultaneously against two apparently con‡icting forms of "tyranny." In fact the two types of tyranny can be reconciled but at the possible cost of con‡ict with other standard welfare principles. We examine whether such con‡icts do arise using a questionnaire-experimental study. Our study shows that both tyrannies are rejected by a majority of the parti- cipants, and in many cases also pose a practical problem in moral reasoning

Keywords: Keywords: social welfare; aggregation; questionnaire; income distribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H20 H21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe and nep-ltv
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cep:stippp:05

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