Loss avoidance as selection principle: evidence from simple stag-hunt games

Ondrej Rydval and Andreas Ortmann

CERGE-EI Working Papers from The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague

Abstract: We investigate experimentally the conjecture that loss avoidance solves the tension in stag-hunt games for which payoff dominance and risk dominance make conflicting predictions. Contrary to received textbook wisdom, money-losing outcomes do shift behavior, albeit not strongly, toward the payoff-dominant equilibrium.

Keywords: Loss avoidance; Selection principle; Stag-hunt games; Coordination games; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C9 D84 D9 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Loss avoidance as selection principle: Evidence from simple stag-hunt games (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cer:papers:wp245

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