A Trace of Anger is Enough: On the Enforcement of Social Norms

Jakub Steiner

CERGE-EI Working Papers from The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague

Abstract: It is well documented that the possibility of punishing free-riders increases contributions in one-shot public good games. I demonstrate theoretically that minimal punishment commitments (perhaps provided by anger) may lead to high contribution levels. Thus, almost selfish players may behave as strong reciprocators.

Keywords: Reciprocity; Emotions; Commitment; Punishment; Public Good. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D64 H41 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cbe and nep-evo
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: A trace of anger is enough: on the enforcement of social norms (2007)
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