Why Can’t a Woman Bid More Like a Man?

Yan Chen, Peter Katuscak () and Emre Ozdenoren

CERGE-EI Working Papers from The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague

Abstract: We find robust gender differences in bidding behavior in sealed bid auctions with independent and private valuations in a laboratory setting. In particular, we find that women bid significantly higher and earn significantly less than men do in the first-price auction, while we find no evidence of a gender difference in the likelihood of dominant strategy play in the second-price auction. At a biological level, in the first-price auction, women during menstruation, when the estrogen level is lowest, do not bid differently from men. The gender difference in the first-price auction is driven by women during other phases of the menstrual cycle when they have higher estrogen levels.

Keywords: Gender; menstrual cycle; auction. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D44 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (61)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Why canʼt a woman bid more like a man? (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cer:papers:wp275

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