Electoral Competition with Rationally Inattentive Voters

Filip Matejka and Guido Tabellini

CERGE-EI Working Papers from The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague

Abstract: This paper studies how voters optimally allocate costly attention in a model of probabilistic voting. The equilibrium solves a modified social planning problem that reflects voters' choice of attention. Voters are more attentive when their stakes are higher, when their cost of information is lower and prior uncertainty is higher. We explore the implications of this in avariety of applications. In equilibrium, extremist voters are more influential and public goods are under-provided. The analysis also yields predictions about the equilibrium pattern of information, and about policy divergence by two opportunistic candidates. Endogenous attention can lead to multiple equilibria, explaining how poor voters in developing countries can be politically empowered by welfare programs.

Keywords: electoral competition; limited inattention (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Electoral Competition with Rationally Inattentive Voters (2021)
Working Paper: Electoral Competition with Rationally Inattentive Voters (2016)
Working Paper: Electoral Competition with Rationally Inattentive Voters (2015)
Working Paper: Electoral Competition with Rationally Inattentive Voters (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cer:papers:wp552

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