Under Pressure? Performance Evaluation of Police Officers as an Incentive to Cheat: Evidence from Drug Crimes in Russia

Ekaterina Travova

CERGE-EI Working Papers from The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague

Abstract: This paper provides an empirical analysis of possible manipulations of amounts of seized drugs, based on a unique dataset that contains full information on drug crimes in Russia reported during 2013-2014. First, using a standard bunching estimator, I investigate the incentives for police officers to manipulate and find that the motivation most likely arises from the officers’ performance evaluation system. Second, applying a novel bunching technique, I determine that police officers are more likely to manipulate the drug amounts seized from repeat offenders. The overall effect of manipulation is an additional year of incarceration, and this is not dependent on a guilty plea.

Keywords: drug crimes; police discretion; performance evaluation; incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 H76 K14 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis, nep-eff, nep-hrm and nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cer:papers:wp637

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